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Introduction
Since the signing of the Key West agreement, the Air Force has slowly diverged from its primary responsibility of supporting the land component. Over the years, growing mistrust and competition for resources among the services, left unchecked by the Department of Defense (DoD), has lead to the development of parochial stovepipes within the service components.
Even in the face of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which was designed to mandate joint interoperability and joint interdependence, service insular behavior has remained firmly ensconced as part of the way the Department of Defense conducts day-to-day operations. At the operational level, the Department of Defense has made significant strides in how they employ the force, but much work remains to be done at the service component (organize, train & equip) level, in order truly see Goldwater-Nichols to fruition. No better example of this dichotomy exists, than that of the DoD's key asymmetric weapon of airpower. In an environment of reduced resources, rapidly evolving threats, and dynamic operating environments, existing DoD airpower force structure is misaligned and does not provide adequate flexibility to support the broad spectrum of desired political outcomes.
History
It was fourteen years ago that the Pentagon last engaged in a top to bottom evaluation of it operates. Now, by the direction of Congress as part of the 2008 Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Department of Defense (DoD) is reevaluating these "Roles and Missions" in conjunction with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Included in the 2008 NDAA, is the requirement for the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to break down and brief Congress on the core mission areas, competencies and capabilities of the armed forces 1 . In a May 2008 press briefing, the DoD outlined seven main areas in which they will focus their efforts, however, among these, the only area Congress actually directed the DoD to study was whether "core mission areas are defined and functions are assigned so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces." 2 While Secretary Gates has yet to fully define his core mission areas for the Department of Defense, the use of airpower, whether viewed as the Air Force does in terms of Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power and Global Strike 3 , or as the Army does in terms of Deep Strike, Close Air Support and Persistent ISR 4 , or as simply as the Navy puts it in terms of "a robust aviation capacity including attack, utility and lift capabilities" 5 The Department of Defense's approach to airpower has been a hotly and continuously debated topic since the 1947 National Security Act that established the Air Force and the subsequent 1948 Key West Agreement that attempted to delineate the roles and missions of the services. The rapid evolution of warfare during the First and Second World Wars had radically altered the spectrum of missions from those of previous wars. During this time, the Army began to exploit mechanization, maneuver and combined arms warfare as popularized by the German blitzkrieg; the Air Corps transformed itself from little more than a novelty prior to the First World War, to a significant fighting force capable of taking the fight to the enemy both at the front and in the deep into enemy territory; and the Navy moved from a battleship-centric fleet to a carrier-centric fleet capable of projecting power over a much larger area of operations and responding more swiftly to events.
, will certainly be among those core competencies.
As technologies rapidly advanced following the Second World War, the services, more than ever before, began to crowd each other's domains. Airpower's increased range and mobility allowed it to venture far out to sea, naval airpower and missile technology enabled the fleet to project power far inland, and enhanced Army maneuver capacity demanded capabilities that mirrored both of the other services. The resultant duplication of effort has endured more as a function of mission overlap than actual redundant force structure. The services have continued to advance their own agendas, and the resultant growing mistrust in the ability of their sister service to adequately support them has widened the band of what the Key West agreement called "collateral functions" .
The most recent attempt to redefine the lines was made by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994, which established the independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) to review the appropriateness of the current allocations of roles, missions and functions among the Armed Forces; evaluate and report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for changes in the current definition and distribution of those roles, missions and functions. The overarching goal was for the CORM was to rethink these roles and missions with particular focus on the dramatically different security environment that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
The results of the 1995 CORM report entitled Directions for Defense can be summed up simply as a missed opportunity. If the goal of the CORM was to provide a blueprint for restructuring the US military for new challenges, then it missed its mark. The future, as the CORM saw it "…will be marked by rapid change, diverse contingencies, limited budgets and a broad range of missions to support national security policies" 6 . However, instead of creating a vision for the future DoD, the CORM merely adopted the department's current disposition and mandated a more joint approach to doctrine in the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. While a few of the CORM's proposals for outsourcing, infrastructure reductions, acquisition reform and consolidation of selected functions certainly had merit, these were mainly just cost savings. In essence the CORM recommended making the Armed Forces smaller and more efficient, rather than smaller and markedly different, as it was chartered to do. This was hardly the dramatic restructuring that was called for and needed in the post Cold War environment.
What's at Stake
To truly understand the complexity and dynamics involved in a task such as restructuring the roles and missions of the Armed Forces, one has to appreciate what is at stake. First and foremost is simply the security of the nation. While this paper will later discuss the failings of the futurists in their efforts to avoid fighting the "last war", the military they envisioned and built, still has no peer on the world stage. There is no denying the combat effectiveness of today's US Armed Forces, the more important question now is at what cost? When it comes to security of the nation, there is no doubt that we value the effectiveness of the military, or how well they accomplish the mission, over the efficiency of our military, or how cheaply they accomplish the mission. However, in an environment of constrained resources the DoD must learn to value efficacy, that is to say the combination of how well they accomplish the mission with as few resources as possible. Although the security of the nation is far too important to gamble on a thin line of resources, the amount of money outside of the entitled programs, that is to say not including
Medicare and Social Security, in the presidential budget is quickly diminishing and the competition for that funding is becoming fiercer. Combined with a shrinking tax base and dramatic slowdown in the economy, the near term prospect of sustaining the DoD's budget appears rather unlikely.
With a shrinking budget looming as real possibility in the near future, the question that begs is, "How can we force the services to take a hard look at their roles and missions aiming to leverage joint interoperability and joint interdependence to and remain effective while gaining 
Distrust, Discord and Competition
The competition among the services for mission predates the establishment of an Air and space power is a maneuver element in its own right, coequal with land and maritime power; as such, it is no longer merely a supporting force to surface combat. As a maneuver element, it can be supported by surface forces in attaining its assigned objectives.
is a good example of the manifestation of this insecurity.
The Air Force's continual assertion of its independence appears to beg for formal acceptance and validation from the other services for fear the Air Force would be relegated to simply a supporting role. Concurrently, the assertion that airpower could be the supported force appears perplexing and probably does more to enhance interservice rivalries than deter them. Further confusing the issue and fanning the flames of interservice rivalry are assertions such as the one described in Learning Large Lessons 10 . In referring to the 2003 version of the Air Force Doctrine Manual 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, Johnson, observes that the Air Force appears to be reverting to the "air power as the decisive war-winning instrument" argument of the past. In discussing Strategic Attack, the manual asserts that "…Operation DESERT STORM proved the efficacy of strategic attack and the follow-on Operations of DELIBERATE FORCE, OEF, and OIF further refined the capability. In these operations, air and space assets conducting strategic attack proved able to deny enemy access to critical resources, defeat enemy strategies, and decisively influence enemy decisions to end hostilities on terms favorable to US interests.
Today's Air Force possesses an independent war-winning potential distinct from and
complementary to its ability to decisively shape surface warfare." Again, all of this strains the language of warfighting and impedes efforts to attain a joint solution to achieving national strategic objectives.
Quite simply, although air power has clearly demonstrated its ability to make a significant contribution to major combat operations, it has not shown that it can independently obtain a strategic political end state. If it could, U.S. forces would not be in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq today. What's more, even if the Air Force could attain the strategic end independently of the other services, much less the whole of government, why would we chose to limit ourselves to just that capability? To its credit, the Air Force eventually backed off from the notion of completely "independent war-winning potential" changing the last sentence to read "…today's Air Force provides joint force commanders with enormous lethal and non-lethal capabilities that can contribute directly to the achievement of strategic objectives"
11
There are many factors that have contributed to overlap, redundancy and excess capacity in missions throughout the DoD. Some even argue that some redundancy is a healthy thing and serves to foster competition among the services. Advocates of this posture often cite the ballistic missile program as a good outcome of this type of thinking. As all three services competed for this mission, their independent research and development led to three important capabilities; the , but one can clearly see the common thread in the parochial thinking.
Air Force ICBM program, the Navy Polaris submarine based ballistic missile system, and the Army ballistic missile program that was eventually cancelled, but laid the ground work for future spacelift. It is safe to say that the competition among the services in this case produced highly desirable outcomes, but half a century later the environment is significantly different. The skyrocketing cost, long lead-time and existing complex, and overly cumbersome acquisition process make the research, development, training and fielding of new capabilities an enormous endeavor. Therefore, competition among the services and redundant capabilities come at such an exorbitant cost in terms of money and effort as to be mostly impracticable and unaffordable.
Although certainly not a comprehensive list of the many factors that have driven us to this dilemma, it is plainly evident that competition for the missions that beget resources, an institutional mistrust among the services, and divergent parochial thinking have been the major contributors. Overcoming this insular thinking will most certainly be a key task in improving efficacy and better posturing a fractured, redundant and inefficient airpower force structure to meet future taskings. How we view the world and the future has a significant ramification on how we posture our force structure to meet those challenges. If we fail to understand that the environment we operate in is highly complex, continuously changing, and inordinately unpredictable vice the clean, simple, and predictable milieu we hope it to be, then we will continue to run down proverbial rabbit holes chasing force structure.
The Futurist Failings
the overall pattern is clear. "War seen as a nonlinear phenomenon-as Clausewitz sees it-is inherently unpredictable by analytical means." He furthers that chance and complexity dominate simplicity in the real world and therefore no two wars are ever the same. In addition, Beyerchen proffers that in Clausewitz' estimation no war is guaranteed to remain structurally stable and, even for all of his analysis, no theory can provide the short-cuts necessary to allow us to skip ahead of the "running" of the actual war. Furthermore, no realistic assumptions offer a way to bypass these uncomfortable truths. The greatest benefit of understanding these truths is their ability to help us identify the blinders we impose on our thinking when we attempt to start thinking of war in a linear manner.
While less proactive than a futurist approach, complexity theory offers a significantly better approach to dealing with surprise, disruption and uncertainty. As Rejeski and Olsen 16 describe it, in order to prepare for the unexpected we must continuously revise and update our situational awareness and work toward creating the long-term outcomes we envision. "Simply being more in tune to the world around you, is one of the best insurance policies against a surprise-filled future." 17 In a Clausewitzian sense, instead of developing a strategy to adapt to the future environment, we need to develop a strategy that links our policy and resources to shape the current environment into the future we envision.
If we then renounce futurist thinking as essentially too much of a gamble to bet the security of the nation on and instead favor the more grounded but less proactive complexity theory approach, how we posture our force becomes more self evident. Our force structure must remain flexible and adaptable to an innumerable number of missions and circumstances. The pinnacle of expertise and capability in any one area must be sacrificed in order to allow the force to rapidly adapt employ and sustain in unpredictable environments and supporting the possibility of several different outcomes.
What the Issue is Not
At the heart of the issue when it comes to roles and missions of the services, there are several important understandings that must be delineated in this debate. These understandings attempt to explain more about what the debate is not about that what the debate is about.
First, and foremost, the debate over roles and missions is not about the ability of one service or another to accomplish the mission by itself. Most often they cannot. The debate must be centered on how the total force can do more missions better and more cheaply then they have in the past. The Department of Defense cannot get distracted in our task looking at secondary or support functions which divert our attention away from the primary goal of redefining roles. In this case they must let function follow form and worry more about the mission that drives the support.
Secondly, the Department of Defense must eliminate the notion that the service components shouldn't specialize in their warfighting and support capabilities. For instance, the Air Force specialization in defensive counter-air has enabled the Army to divest of a significant portion of its air defense artillery. As with any significant endeavor, the more you hope to accomplish with the task, the more generic your approach will necessarily become. There is a saying paraphrased from a former Columbia University President 18 If you accept that in and effort to do too much, you must avoid the pitfall of becoming the generalist, than the corollary must also be true. The Department of Defense must also be wary of becoming the ultimate specialist who knows more and more about less and less until he knows absolutely everything about almost nothing. Too much specialization and focus on one certain capability or mission for the services can radically deprecate the flexibility necessary in an unpredictable and highly complex environment.
which states that the generalist knows more and more about less and less until he knows absolutely nothing about everything. If the Department of Defense hopes to maintain the asymmetric advantage we hold in airpower than we must avoid the trap of becoming the ultimate generalist.
The last understanding that must be understood is that this discussion of roles and missions is not about service components. This discussion is about who will organize, train and equip specific capabilities for use by the Combatant Commanders in support of national taskings.
Service components and service component commanders exist in their Title 10 function to provide the Joint Force Commander with capabilities to fight wars, therefore the decision as to where the mission will bed down should be based on the component best able to organize, train, and equip those capabilities for presentation to the Combatant Commanders.
Case Studies
The Communications C-27J won the selection competition and a contract for 78 C-27Js (54 Army, 24
Air Force) at a cost of just over $2 billion was awarded.
In September of that same year, the Air Force expressed interest in developing a small intra-theatre airlift capability of its own, eventually asking for 150 Light Cargo Aircraft or LCAs.
There is some allowance in joint doctrine for each service component to maintain a small fleet of aircraft to meet service-specific needs. 22 In the JCA MOA that was signed between the services, the Army dictates that it will use the JCA in "direct support" of its ground operations by providing "on-demand transport of time-sensitive/mission-critical cargo and key personnel to forward deployed Army units operating in a Joint Operations Area." Government" and assigns mission responsibility to U.S. Transportation Command.
The key to the Army approach is that it primarily views this capability as on-call airlift directly tied to the tactical needs of ground commanders.
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This microcosm of the relationship between the two services is the heart of the matter and, as is plainly derived from the above two paragraphs, command and control of these forces is the nucleus of the argument. The Army may argue that they are responsible for sustaining their force and should be able to chose and control the vehicle for doing so. The Air Force would argue that creating "two air forces" is inefficient and that they are capable of supporting
The key difference in thought process between the Army and the Air Force is that under this construct,
the Air Force allocates available aircraft to all users in accordance with a Joint Force
Commander's (JFC's) priorities. The main goal of this approach is the most efficient and effective use of every aircraft/sortie. sustainment at both the strategic and tactical levels. Clearly though, the most passionate argument comes over who has control of the execution.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Yet another program where the DoD has failed to adequately embrace the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols act is that of the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). In FY 2000, the DoD inventory of unmanned systems consisted of fifty aircraft. By May of 2008, that number had grown to six thousand and was expanding. The disparate and seemingly haphazard approach the DoD has taken toward the UAS has failed to provide for a common, joint, and effective UAS program and to address challenges such as the development and acquisition of the UAS and the integration of these force multipliers into combat operations.
The DOD categorizes UAS into three main classes-man-portable, tactical, and theater.
Man-portable UAS are small, self-contained, and easily moveable and are generally used to support small ground combat teams in the field. Tactical UAS are slightly larger systems, generally used to support operational units at the tactical level of command, such as a battalion or brigade. Theater UAS are controlled by the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) and are generally used to support the combatant commander's ISR priorities, but in certain circumstances, can be assigned to support tactical operations.
Many of the systems currently being employed or planned for are part of formal DOD acquisition programs. UAS can be government owned and operated, government owned and contractor operated, or contractor owned and operated. Although every military service and U.S.
Special Operations Command operates several types of UAS, each does not currently operate a UAS in every UAS class. Table 1 -E. F. Schumacker
As the DoD and the House Armed Services Committee move forward in evaluating the Armed Services roles and missions, they must make every effort to maximize the efficacy of the force structure by simplifying the approach to delineating roles and missions. In the spirit of
Ockham's razor which posits that given two competing theories, the simplest explanation is to be preferred,
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In terms of airpower, the domain is defined as air and space. Certainly, a strong argument can be made, and has been made in the past, in support of a separate domain for space, but as the service components do not currently have a "Space Force", we will include these in the domain of airpower. If, in the future, Congress and the President want to take a true domaincentric approach to how the DoD is structured, then strong arguments most certainly could be made for separating space from that of airpower, as well as for cyberspace and the establishment the DoD should move toward assigning roles and missions to the services based on the simplistic approach to the domain in which they employ. That is to say, the forces that employ on land should belong to the Army; in the air, Air Force and at sea, the Navy.
Fundamentally, this would allow the services to provide unity of effort in acquisition programs, focus effort on core tasks and capabilities, and enhance the joint interoperability envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and codified in Joint Doctrine.
of a cyber component to employ in that domain and provide joint interoperability to the force. However, this paper will limit the recommendation to the existing Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine service components.
Utilizing this simplistic approach of defining service roles and missions by domain would align, Army, Navy, and Marine airpower force structure under the Air Force. Conversely, missions such as Air Base Defense and arguably a significant portion of the support functions would transfer over to the Army. The parochial thinking that would need to be overcome in execution of this realignment would, undoubtedly, be enormous, but the eventual benefits gained in efficacy, cost savings and interoperability would far outweigh pain and effort required to make it happen. It is quite easy to dismiss this approach as being unrealistic, or "too difficult", but the only way to make substantial impact on how we act jointly and simultaneously streamline the DoD airpower force structure is to introduce a significant shock into the system. This paper discusses some of the benefits and hurdles that would need to be overcome in order for this approach to be realized, but in the end, this is the approach that was first intended when the Air Force was established, but was eventually watered down by service component infighting.
One of the most obvious benefits of consolidating airpower force structure under one service is that of efficiency. Instead of a large force of disparate types of aircraft, the Air Force could unify acquisition efforts, significantly reduce logistical support and maintenance tail, and streamline training support requirements. The case study with regards to the Joint Cargo Aircraft is an example of where the DoD almost got to the right solution but fell short in the end. While they were able move the services (Army and Air Force) to a joint program, they fell short of putting the entire program in the same service. In failing to do so, OSD chose to placate the service components instead of forcing the Air Force to fulfill its primary mission of supporting the other services. From the beginning, this program should have been tasked to the Air Force in a supporting role for the other service components. In the end, the Department of Defense will sacrifice the efficiency made possible by unity of effort.
While multiple examples of the potential benefits in terms of cost savings can be presented, one of the most important benefits that would be gained through a domain driven approach is that of interoperability. By parsing the roles and missions of the services in this manner, it drives them to be more, and act more, interdependent. As the services continue to foster, grow and practice interdependence in day-to-day operations their efforts will translate to better joint operations when deployed. The habitual relationship and "common language" that will emerge from the reliance on service interdependence will help breakdown stovepipes, broaden the lines of communication, and better prepare us to execute as a whole. As compared to those of streamlining acquisition and force structure, the benefits of attaining true joint interdependence are difficult to measure, but one can certainly argue that by doing so, we can not only be more efficient, but more also more effective.
The arguments against a roles and mission split based on domain are largely emotional, often based on strong paradigms of how we operate, and enhanced by historical mistrust and competition for resources. The other services would argue the importance of maintaining their organic capability and that by transferring their airpower to the Air Force they would sacrifice flexibility and lose control over those forces. However, transferring the forces does not prohibit the Combatant Commanders' prerogative to partition the forces as they see appropriate. The main focus of a domain oriented approach is to better organize, train, and equip the force within the given resources and to promote interoperability and would have little bearing on how the JFC desires to task organize his forces for combat.
Further complicating the issue of force structure "ownership" is the method in which funding is given to the services. Under the current construct, giving up force structure would also entail transfer of resources or what the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) calls Total Obligation Authority (TOA). Transfer of TOA to another component, by its very nature, reduces the flexibility of service in how it delegates its assigned resources. Congress and OSD will need to address this approach to resourcing the components with an eye toward centralizing acquisition funding at the OSD. Essentially, this means that the services would be given the funding they need for day-to-day operations, but all money used for the development and acquisition of new weapons systems would remain at the OSD level. The aim of this effort would be to ensure those programs are interoperable and meet cross-service requirements. If we break the paradigm of how the services are resourced, we can eliminate a major roadblock to a thorough Roles and Missions review using a domain concept.
The barriers brought about by historical mistrust among the service components are also significant obstacles to this strategic approach. We are beginning to see evidence of some of these barriers being broken, but those are hard fought battles and take an inordinate amount of effort to overcome. The Army's and Marine Corps' ability to leave most of its organic field artillery behind for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a paradigm shift brought about by the confidence of the Army and the Marine Corps in the Air Force and Marine airpower's ability to deliver reliable Close Air Support (CAS) in a timely manner. In essence it was, and continues to be, an issue of trust. Building trust requires a habitual relationship and historical reliability that will only be attained through time and with Air Force continued focus on support for the ground component.
Conclusion
Our doubts are traitors, and make us lose the good we oft might win by fearing to attempt.
-William Shakespeare
The 2008 NDAA, in response to the House Armed Services Committee's requirement for the Department of Defense to evaluate how its Roles and Missions are structured as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review, has opened a window of opportunity for OSD to make significant and sweeping changes to how the service components provide forces to the Combatant Commanders. The Key West agreement and the Goldwater-Nichols Act envisioned a truly joint effort from the service components with a focus on seamless interoperability, however, the parochial attitudes of the service components, fights over missions that beget resources, and growing distrust among the components has created a fractured, redundant and inefficient system in an environment of diminishing resources.
A domain oriented approach to delineating Roles and Missions among the service components would need to overcome strong, paradigm driven, opposition in order to be successful, but is just the type of shock that the system needs to enable significant change. The simple elegance of a domain driven method would clarify the seams between the services, streamline acquisition and logistics, and demand better interoperability between the services.
The arguments against defining roles and missions by domain are predominately emotional issues of historical trust and unfounded worries about lack of flexibility, but these can easily be overcome by building habitual relationships, and day-to-day reliance on interoperability.
Achieving this goal requires the services shrug off parochial ties and break from the idea of "ownership" when it comes to resources and force structure to take up the greater good. The service components must also come to understand that they are not the warfighters and merely serve to organize, train and equip forces to present to the Combatant Commanders. Additionally, in the arena of airpower, the Air Force must come to grips with its role as the supporting force on almost every occasion and understand the value of that mission. In the end, if OSD and
Congress have the strength and political will to reshape how the services are structured, the nation could realize enormous benefits both in the fiscal environment and on the battlefield.
